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In 2001, the Audubon String Quartet expelled its first violinist, who then
successfully sued the Quartet for more than $600,000. In the resulting
bankruptcy proceedings, the musicians' instruments were liquidated to cover
their debts. Classical musicians were outraged that the instruments were not
covered under the "tools of the trade" exemption to bankruptcy liquidations.
They prophesized the demise of one of the oldest American string quartets. Yet
the Quartet regained its instruments and continued to operate for several years.
This Comment will explain how the Audubon's post-bankruptcy recovery
of their instruments aligns with the behavior and outcomes predicted by the
Coase Theorem. It will then show how the Audubon's ability to regain their
instruments without access to the tools of the trade exemption undermines the
assumptions underlying the exemption in the first place. The exemption's
purported benefits are questionable, and it imposes new transaction costs that
impede Coasian bargaining and harm borrowers and lenders alike.
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Introduction
When the Audubon String Quartet played its final concert last August, it
marked the end of a thirty-seven-year run for one of the United States' elite
string quartets.' However, the event went largely unnoticed outside the classical
music world.
t Yale Law School, J.D., 2012; Harvard College, A.B., 2007. The author would like to thank
David Wishnick for his helpful feedback on early drafts of this Comment. He would also like to thank
Allyson Bennett and the Yale Journal on Regulation edit team for their helpful suggestions in preparing
this Comment for publication.
1. See Press Release, Audubon String Quartet, Audubon Quartet Announces Final Concert as
an Ensemble (Apr. 11, 2011), available at www.audubon4tet.com/release.html (announcing that the
Quartet would perform its last concert on August 8, 2011 because its members had decided to pursue
other projects); see also Mike Allen, Arts & Extras: Audubon Quartet To Go Four Separate Ways,
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Yet to anyone interested in bankruptcy law or law and economics, the
quiet nature of the Quartet's dissolution should itself have been notable. Six
years ago, the Audubon was grappling not with Beethoven, but with
bankruptcy liquidation, and The New York Times and National Public Radio
both reported on the Quartet's imminent involuntary demise. Yet in 2010, the
2
Quartet was going on a national tour to celebrate its thirty-fifth anniversary.
The story of how the Audubon unexpectedly emerged from bankruptcy
provides a powerful illustration of the applicability of the Coase Theorem to
bankruptcies, with important implications for law.
This Comment will explore the previously unexamined law and
economics of the Audubon String Quartet bankruptcy. It will focus specifically
on the "tools of the trade" exemption at the heart of the Audubon case. This
exemption precludes creditors from seizing "tools of the trade" in bankruptcy
liquidations.3 During the Audubon's bankruptcy, the Quartet and its allies
argued vigorously that the exemption was insufficiently narrow because it did
not cover their instruments. This Comment will argue that the Audubon's
successful recovery of its instruments, in spite of losing this dispute, suggests
the opposite. Not only does the tools of the trade exemption not need to be
expanded; the Audubon's experience provides strong reason to question the
exemption's existence in the first place.
The Comment will make this argument in three parts. First, it will explain
the Audubon's bankruptcy and the Quartet's argument that the tools of the
trade exemption should have been expanded to cover their case. Second, it will
show how the Audubon's process of recovery aligns with the predictions of the
Coase Theorem. It will further discuss how the applicability of the Coase
Theorem to the Audubon's case undermines not only the musicians' specific
arguments, but also the core assumption behind the tools of the trade exemption
in general. Finally, the Comment will discuss the costs of the tools of the trade
exemption and argue that, in light of the questionable assumptions underlying
the exemption, those costs outweigh any benefits.
I. The Audubon Quartet Bankruptcy
To their listeners, string quartets are mediums of beauty and harmony.
Internally, however, string quartets notoriously are anything but harmonious.
As Time Magazine pithily put it, "one of the quickest ways to lose friends is to
ROANOKE TIMES (Va.), Apr. 26, 2011, http://www.roanoke.com/extra/arts/wb/284234 (announcing the
Quartet's dissolution).
2. See Program Guide, Reston Comty. Ctr., The CenterStage Professional Touring Art Series,
The Audubon Quartet in Their 35th Anniversary Season (Mar. 2010), available at
http://www.restoncommunitycenter.com/inages/CenterStageImages/Audubon.pdf.




engage in the precarious art of chamber music."4 In the winter of 1999-2000,
such strife hit the Audubon Quartet. Due to interpersonal, musical, and
organizational disagreements, three of the Quartet's members, including
founder Clyde Thomas Shaw, sought to expel the first violinist David Ehrlich.
Ehrlich filed a wrongful termination lawsuit against his former colleagues in
Pennsylvania, where the Quartet was incorporated as a nonprofit.5 Ehrlich
argued that he was a minority shareholder in a closed corporation and that he
had been unfairly "squeezed out" by the majority shareholders in violation of
6their fiduciary duties. The Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County
agreed, holding "the treatment of Ehrlich to be oppressive."7 The court ordered
the other three members to pay damages related to his twenty-five-percent
equity stake in the Quartet, his lost earnings, and his legal fees.8 All told, this
amounted to approximately $600,000.9
This liability proved too much for the Quartet to bear, and on December
12, 2001, the Quartet and its members filed for bankruptcy.' 0 Bankruptcy, in
turn, prompted a host of new legal issues for the Quartet. Most notably, the
Quartet and the bankruptcy trustee contested whether the Quartet's members
could keep their instruments, or whether they would be auctioned off and
liquidated in order to cover their debts." Section 522 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code allows debtors to exempt from liquidation certain classes of assets,
including any "tools of the trade of the debtor" up to a certain value.1 2 State
laws include similar exemptions, and it is the debtor's choice whether to take
the federal exemptions or the exemptions of the state in which the bankruptcy
adjudication is proceeding.13 The Quartet elected to take the state exemptions
of Virginia, which has one of the most debtor-friendly caps for "tools of the
trade" exemptions, allowing up to $10,000.14 But even this generous cap came
nowhere close to encompassing the Quartet's instruments, which were valued at
more than $150,000.15 The lawyer for Shaw and his wife, Doris Lederer
4. Chamber Music: The Brothers Four, TIME (May 6, 1966),
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,901862,00.html.
5. See Joel Rose, Audubon String Quartet Lawsuit Mixes Music, Business, NAT'L PUB. RADIO
(Dec. 9, 2005), http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=5046870.
6. Ehrlich v. Audubon Quartet, Inc., Case No. GD 00-9438 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Oct. 12, 2001),
available at http://mysite.verizon.net/renardym/paruling.pdf.
7. Id. at 12.
8. Id. at 13.
9. Id. at 12-13, 16.
10. See In re Wiencko, 275 B.R. 772, 775 (Bankr. W.D. Va. 2002).
11. See Lindsey Nair, Judge Orders Liquidation of Members' Instruments, ROANOKE TIMES
(Va.), Dec. 14, 2005, http://www.roanoke.com/news/roanoke/wb/xp-44396.
12. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006).
13. See id. § 522(b)(2)(A).
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 34-26 (2011). The Federal Code, by way of comparison, allows less
than $1000 for such exemptions. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(6) (2006); see also In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140,
1147 (7th Cir. 1987) (discussing the wide variation in states' caps and citing $10,000 as a generous cap).
15. See Nair, supra note 11.
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(another member of the Quartet), argued that the musicians should nevertheless
be able to keep their instruments. "'Tools of the trade' doesn't really describe
what we're dealing with here," he argued. The bankruptcy court, however,
disagreed, calling the decision to liquidate the instruments a "no-brainer."17
The classical music world entered a state of despondency and outrage
over the decision. Lederer cried outside of the courtroom. "I can't even imagine
turning [my instrument] over," she lamented.1 "It's just the judicial system
gone awry," Shaw told The New York Times. "It's a horrible, horrible thing.
Our instruments are our voices, our souls."' 9 Shaw and Lederer were not alone
in their despair. A public letter by nearly one hundred classical musicians
called the liquidation of the instruments "devastating" and prophesized that the
seizure would "effectively restrict[] the performing careers" of the musicians. 20
Even Ehrlich, under attack from the majority of his colleagues, became
defensive about his decision to sue. "I would never have gone the distance if I
did not believe very, very strongly that [my firing] was really outrageous," he
told The Times. "I want to be whole again."21 Joel Rose, covering the story for
National Public Radio, summarized the consensus among classical musicians
that "the story will end with four losers and no real winner."22
Evidently, the classical music world was not familiar with the Coase
Theorem.
II. Coasean Bargaining and Emergence from Bankruptcy
To the classical music world, the bankruptcy court's decision to liquidate
the Audubon's instruments was unjust because the musicians lost property that
they, uniquely, valued. The instruments were attached to their "souls" and
crucial to their earning a living.23 Put otherwise, since they were the highest-
valuing users of the instruments, a proper allocation of legal entitlements would
allow them to keep the instruments.
The Coase Theorem, however, teaches that an efficient allocation of
resources does not require an efficient initial distribution. Rather, irrespective
of initial distributions, parties will, absent transaction costs, sell and trade




19. Daniel J. Wakin, The Broken Chord, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2005,
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/li/arts/music/Ilwaki.html.
20. Musicians Abhor Continued Litigation Against Audubon Quartet Members, AUDUBON
QUARTEr, http://www.audubon4tet.com/musicianspetition.pdf (last visited Dec. 5, 2011).
21. Wakin, supra note 19.
22. Rose, supra note 5.
23. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
24. Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3. J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); see A. MITCHELL




Moreover, it is impossible to know with certainty who the highest-valuing user
of a given resource even is until parties are given a chance to trade resources
and reveal their preferences. Thus, legal systems like bankruptcy should focus
not on efficient initial distributions, but instead on allocating entitlements in
ways that minimize transaction costs, allowing parties to bargain their way to
25socially efficient outcomes.
Legislatures have enacted tools of the trade exemptions in attempts to be
consistent with the goal of minimizing transaction costs. In a world of zero
transaction costs, it would not matter if debtors' possessions were liquidated
and sold because debtors could simply buy the possessions back if they were
truly their highest-valuing users. But the entire premise of bankruptcy is that
debtors are constrained by a huge transaction cost: inadequate wealth.26 Even if
a debtor is the highest-valuing user of her possessions, she cannot buy them
back if she has no money. Hence the tools of the trade exemption. The
exemption's purpose, in the words of Judge Posner, is to prevent a debtor from
being "forced out of his trade."27 This provides a debtor with an opportunity to
"rehabilitate himself financially," 28 which in turn allows the debtor to buy back
any liquidated possessions of which he is the highest-valuing owner.
Yet this justification for the tools of the trade exemption29 not only
requires inadequate debtor wealth, but also requires broader market illiquidity.
The intrinsic value of the "tools" themselves is not what enables the debtor to
rehabilitate himself financially and obtain a fresh start. Rather, it is their value
in enabling the debtor to generate future income streams. If a debtor is truly
capable of being profitable in her "trade" going forward, one would expect
third parties to simply lend her money to procure the necessary "tools" for
profitability in that trade even if she lost them in bankruptcy.30
In the case of the Audubon String Quartet, this is precisely what
happened. No less than a month after the bankruptcy court ordered the
25. See James W. Bowers, Rehabilitation, Redistribution or Dissipation: The Evidence for
Choosing Among Bankruptcy Hypotheses, 72 WASH. U. L.Q. 955, 965-66 (1994); Alan Schwartz, A
Contract Theory Approach to Business Bankruptcy, 107 YALE L.J. 1807, 1809 (1998).
26. Although wealth effects are not "costs" in the conventional sense of the term, they are best
conceptualized as a transaction cost for the purposes of the Coase Theorem because they are
impediments to bargaining.
27. In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140, 1146 (7th Cir. 1987).
28. William T. Vukowich, Debtors'Exemption Rights, 62 GEO. L.J. 779, 786 (1974).
29. Case law across jurisdictions affirms that the tools of the trade exemption is intended to
allow debtors to generate future income. See, e.g., In re Aurelio, 252 B.R. 102, 107 (Bankr. N.D. Miss.
2000) ("In order to claim a tools of the trade exemption, one must be engaged in a particular trade or
profession at the time of filing or have formerly been engaged in the trade or profession and have the
present intent to resume the trade."); Sun Cnty. Distribs. of La., Inc. v. Starkey, 637 So. 2d 739, 740 (La.
Ct. App. 1994) (stating that the exemption only applies to tools that are "necessary for the exercise of
the [debtor's] profession").
30. This may be contrasted with most other debtor exemptions, which exempt property with
self-contained values. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(2) (2006) (allowing debtors to exempt a motor
vehicle). With those possessions, wealth disparities alone might serve as an impediment to Coasian
bargaining because the possessions would not necessarily generate future cash flows to repay a lender.
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instruments liquidated, a third party stepped in. That third party was Daniel
Braden, a wealthy freelance musician who buys instruments as an investment
and lends them to professional musicians. Braden agreed to purchase the
Quartet's instruments for $200,000, conditioned upon Ehrlich accepting that
sum in full satisfaction of the original judgment he had won in Pennsylvania
court.3 Braden then lent the instruments back to the Quartet members for a
period of ten years, at which point the musicians would have the opportunity to
re-acquire the instruments from him if they could afford it. 32 And if anyone
should posit Braden was motivated purely by altruism, think again: "I want to
make it very clear, I'm not a donor," he told The New York Times. "I'm buyin
the instruments [as an investment] and loaning them back to [the Quartet]." 3
Thus, thanks to Coasean bargaining, the initial despondency of Shaw, Lederer,
and the classical music world proved to be superfluous. As its thirty-fifth
anniversary tour demonstrates, the Quartet survived the bankruptcy
proceedings. The musicians regained their residency at the Shenandoah
Conservatory, and all of the pre-2000 members other than Ehrlich remained
Quartet members until the Quartet decided to disband several years later.3 4
Although the Quartet dissolved in 2011, its members continue to perform, and
they retain their positions at Shenandoah University. 35
As the Coase Theorem suggests, therefore, the tools of the trade
exemption proved unnecessary for the Audubon members to maintain
possession of their instruments. Ironically, however, if there ever was a "tools
of the trade" case in which the barriers to Coasean bargaining were high, it was
the case of the Audubon Quartet. First, the value of the Quartet's instruments
was far greater than the value of the tools in most tools of the trade exemption
cases.36 More expensive tools require more market liquidity for loans because
investors have to be willing to part with more upfront capital to realize their
eventual returns. 37 Second, unlike most tools of the trade, the Audubon's
31. Given the Quartet's limited personal assets, Ehrlich was unlikely to receive his full
damages even without a settlement.
32. Daniel J. Wakin, How Audubon Musicians Kept Their Instruments, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7,
2006, http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/07/arts/music/07audu.html.
33. Id.
34. See Audubon Quartet, Lois ScoTr MGMT., INC.,
http://www.loisscottmanagement.com/audubon.php (last visited Dec. 16, 2011); Press Release, Audubon
String Quartet, supra note 1.
35. Allen, supra note 1.
36. Even the most generous exemptions, designed to encompass most debtors' "tools," are
capped well below the value of the Quartet's instruments. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
Even in machinery-heavy industries, such as farming, the requisite tools may be less expensive than
classical instruments. See, e.g., In re Patterson, 825 F.2d 1140-1141 (7th Cir. 1987) (stating that fifty-
one cows and a tractor were auctioned for $24,600, roughly $48,000 in today's dollars.)
37. A counterargument to this point is that many large banks avoid micro-loans because of the
fixed administrative costs for each loan. However, a robust business of micro-creditors has developed in
the United States in recent decades to provide this capital. See Jay MacDonald, Micro-Loans Help




instruments were not only means of income generation, but also had intangible
value connected to the musicians' senses of self.38 For such possessions
connected to a debtor's personhood, wealth disparities alone might serve as an
impediment to Coasean bargaining because the personhood value cannot be
liquidated into future cash flows. Yet, in spite of these two potential obstacles,
lending markets proved sufficiently liquid to facilitate Coasean bargaining and
allow the Audubon to regain possession of its instruments.
The Audubon's tragicomic saga, then, is more than an entertaining story.
That the Quartet regained their instruments without the assistance of the tools
of the trade exemption, despite the presence of circumstances suggesting the
exemption would be particularly necessary, throws into question whether the
exemption is ever necessary.
A skeptic might counter that the substantial publicity surrounding the
Audubon's saga might have helped secure Braden's loan and that this publicity
is not present in most bankruptcy cases. The wide availability of micro-loans to
relatively unknown start-up companies of all kinds,39 though, suggests that
publicity surrounding the Audubon bankruptcy was not a prerequisite for
Coasean bargaining. Indeed, if anything, the publicity associated with the case
suggests that it might be a rare window into widespread-but unpublicized-
Coasean bargaining in bankruptcy liquidations. Unlike Braden's decision to
buy the Quartet's instruments and lend them back, a typical loan to a debtor
who lost the tools of his trade would not be covered in The New York Times,
and, therefore, would not be available for scholarly citation and analysis.
III. Costs of the Exemption and Conclusion
The irrelevance of tools of the trade exemptions to debtors' ability to
regain financial footing would be a purely academic matter if the exemption did
not carry costs of its own. Unfortunately, it does. Indeed, one of the more
significant negative impacts of the tools of the trade exemption is on market
liquidity, the very phenomenon that permits Coasean bargaining in bankruptcy
liquidations in the first place. As Judge Easterbrook explained in a case on the
subject:
Any fresh-start policy must balance the gains from new beginnings against the costs of making
it harder for lenders to collect. The more difficult collection becomes, the fewer assets are
available to secure loans, the costlier is credit. Every expansion of . .. [a tools of the trade]
http://www.bankrate.com/brm/news/biz/Capital-borrowing/20001013.asp (discussing the ease with
which small businesses can secure micro-loans as compared to larger loans).
38. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
39. See MacDonald, supra note 37. Although lending has tightened during the recession, this
tightening results from broader macro-economic conditions rather than insufficient lender information.
See Elizabeth A. Duke, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Address at the 2011 International Factoring
Association Conference: Small Business Credit Availability (Apr. 14, 2011),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/duke20l10414a.htm.
251
Yale Journal on Regulation
exemption statute makes loans riskier for banks and so raises the interest rate (or makes banks
unwilling to lend at all to some people). This effect, which burdens the frugal and spendthrift
alike, can swamp the gains of fresh starts.4
This cost is not merely theoretical. Several studies by economists
demonstrate that the marginal risk of credit default has tangible impacts on
lending interest rates .4 While these studies do not quantify the impact of the
tools of the trade exemption specifically, the exemptions subject close to $1
billion of credit, annually, to additional risk.42 At this volume, it is difficult to
imagine that the tools of the trade exemption does not have at least some
impact on credit availability. Thus, the tools of the trade exemption not only is
unnecessary for promoting efficiency in bankruptcy liquidations, but it also
creates new transaction costs that may actively preclude efficiency.
Nor can the tools-of-the-trade exemption be justified on distributive
grounds. It is true that allowing bankrupt debtors to keep their tools, rather than
requiring them to buy new ones through a loan, provides them with a wealth
gain equal to the value of the tool (though not equal to the stream of revenue
the tool generates, which they could receive anyway). Yet this wealth gain
comes largely at the expense not of lenders, but of other high-risk debtors.
These debtors are equally subjected to the higher interest rates resulting from
the credit risk created by the tools of the trade exemption, 43 yet they will
receive no benefit from the exemption. In other words, the tools of the trade
exemption generates a wealth transfer from poor individuals who do not default
on their debts to poor individuals who do. It hurts most acutely the segment of
society that is arguably most in need of support and creates a perverse financial
incentive for individuals to file for bankruptcy when they otherwise would not
do so.
A similar moral hazard exists for forgiveness of debts incurred through
tort, such as the Audubon members' damages to Ehrlich. The easier it is for
debtors to avoid payment of tort damages through bankruptcy, the less effective
the tort system will be in achieving its objectives, be they deterring normatively
wrongful behavior or efficiently allocating social costs. Such "judgment
40. In re Erickson, 815 F.2d 1090, 1094 (7th Cir. 1987).
41. See, e.g., Satyajit Chatterjee et al., A Quantitative Theory of Unsecured Consumer Credit
with Risk of Default, 75 ECONOMETRICA 1525 (2007); Jan Ericsson & Olivier Renault, Liquidity and
Credit Risk, 61 J. FIN. 2219 (2006).
42. From 2007 to 2010, there were an average of roughly 80,000 non-business Chapter 7
bankruptcy filings each year. For the data used to calculate the average, see Annual Non-Business
Filings by Chapter (2007-2010), AM. BANKR. INST.,
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfn?Section=AnnualU S Filings 1 &Template=/TaggedPage/T
aggedPageDisplay.cfm&TPLID-62&ContentlD=36294 (last visited Dec. 5, 2011). Even states with low
caps for the tools of the trade exemption generally allow roughly $ 1000, while many states allow much
more. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
43. See Chatterjee et al., supra note 41, at 1527 ("[Tlhe price charged on a loan of a given size
made to a household with given characteristics exactly compensates lenders for the objective default




proofing" through bankruptcy has been well documented in the context of large
companies looking to deflect mass tort claims.44 There is no reason to believe
individuals, when feasible, would not attempt to similarly use bankruptcy to
insulate themselves from tort judgments.
This is not to argue against all policies that help give debtors a fresh start
by limiting creditors' ability to collect. 4 5 It is to say that this objective would be
served better by exemptions that focus not on tools of the trade, but rather, as
several other exemptions do, on personal items with little value on the open
46market and no ability to generate future revenue streams. Exempting these
items would have little marginal impact on liquidity and interest rates because
creditors would not be able to recoup capital through their liquidation in the
first place. And they likely have greater intrinsic value to debtors, since they
are not merely means to future income streams that debtors would be able to
obtain anyway. The tools of the trade exemption, in contrast, has little to offer
by way of giving debtors a fresh start that they could not already receive, and it
generates a host of unnecessary costs for debtors and creditors alike.
To the self-appointed legal analysts of the classical music world, the
Audubon's bankruptcy revealed that the limits on the tools of the trade
exemption were unjustly low. 4 7 This inference was gravely mistaken. The
actual implication of the Audubon's saga is that the tools of the trade
exemption may not be valuable at all.
44. See Lynn M. LoPucki, Virtual Judgment Proofing: A Rejoinder, 107 YALE L.J. 1413,
1413, 1418-1420 (1998); Steve Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 45
(1986).
45. See generally Thomas H. Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1393 (1985) (discussing the potential benefits of such policies).
46. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(3) (2006) (exempting household furnishings).
47. See supra notes 15-20 and accompanying text.
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